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THE POTENTIAL PASSAGE OF PROPOSED SENATE BILL
578 AND ITS IMPLICATION ON HICKS V. NEVADA AND
TWENTY YEARS OF SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
RichardL. Warren*
I. Introduction
In Nevada v. Hicks,' the United States Supreme Court held that state officers
may enter the Fallone Paiute-Shoshone reservation without tribal permission to
investigate or prosecute an off-reservation violation of state law.2 The Court
held that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear civil rights cases under
federal law, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1983' claims, because they are not "courts
of 'general jurisdiction."'4 In so holding, the Court found in concert with over
twenty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Limits were imposed on both
tribal judicial and executive powers, while at the same time state jurisdiction
was expanding within Indian country.5
In response to Hicks, Sen. Daniel Inouye (D.-Haw.) introduced a bill on
March 7, 2003, known as the Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (Senate Bill 578).6 Senate Bill 578 seeks to amend the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to include Indian tribes among the entities
* Second-year-student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
2. Id. at 374.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless
a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.")
4. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 367-68.
5. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
6. Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, S. 578, 108th
Cong. (2003), http://thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (select 108th Congress, then search by
Bill Number for S. 578) (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) [hereinafter S.578, 108th Cong.].
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consulted regarding activities carried out by the Secretary of Homeland
Security.7 This bill or any similar version of it,' if passed, would effectively
reverse Hicks and numerous other Supreme Court decisions over the past twenty
years that govern the extent of tribal sovereignty, tribal jurisdiction over non-
members, authority of taxation, and the power of tribal courts.9
This note contains five parts. Part II addresses the background regarding the
history of tribal sovereignty and highlights landmark decisions leading up to
Nevada v. Hicks. Subpart B in Part II provides an explanation of the proposed
Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Part
III provides an overview of the facts and procedural history of Nevada v. Hicks
in Subpart A and summarizes the majority's opinion in Subpart B. Subpart A
of Part IV offers analysis and discussion that demonstrates that t Senate Bill 578
would effectively reverse the decision in Nevada v. Hicks and reverse over
twenty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Subpart B of Part IV sets forth
Senator Inouye's reasons for supporting Senate Bill 578. This note concludes
in Part V.
I. Indian Sovereignty: Setting the Stage for Hicks
A. Indian Sovereignty Case Law
Three Supreme Court cases known as the Marshall Trilogy0 continue to
provide the foundation for Federal Indian law and issues of tribal jurisdiction. II
In Johnson v. McIntosh, 2 the issue was whether title issued by Indian nations to
private citizens could be recognized by the United States. 3 The Court adopted
the principle of discovery and held that the nation that discovered the land had
7. Id.
8. Senate Bill 578 was sent to Committee on July 3, 2003. There is no indication that this
bill is still pending. However, lobbying and special interest groups anticipate that a revision or
modification of this bill will be reintroduced in a later congressional session. Therefore, Senate
Bill 578 or any subsequent revision of this bill would reverse Hicks and twenty years of
Supreme Court decisions.
9. Letter from Citizens Equal Rights Alliance to Senator Norman Coleman Regarding
Senate Bill 578 (Apr. 15,2003), available at http://www.citizensalliance.org/The%20Hicks%20
Fix/S.578/ LetterCongress.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
10. DAVID H. GETCHES ETAL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 73-74 (4th
ed. 1998) (stating that three cases make up the Marshall Trilogy: Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S.
(1 Wheat) 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515 (1832)).
11. Id.
12. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
13. Id. at 571-72.
[Vol. 29
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the sole right of acquiring it from the native people.14 Therefore, the
discovering nation had the sole right to purchase that land to create settlements
for white settlers. 5 Consequently, the Court held that Indian nations had no
power to transfer or sell lands to anyone other than the United States
government. 6 This significantly limited tribal sovereignty by restricting the
Indians' right to sell land despite the fact they were considered to be legal
occupants of the land.' 7
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia8 is the second case in the Marshall Trilogy. In
Cherokee Nation, the state of Georgia attempted to execute and enforce laws
within Cherokee territory resulting in the Cherokees seeking an injunction to
prohibit this action by Georgia.19 Although the Cherokee Nation argued that it
was a foreign state under Article III of the United States Constitution, the Court
held that it was not a foreign state2° but instead was a "domestic dependent
nation."'" In identifying the Cherokee Nation as a "domestic dependent nation,"
the Court noted that "[t]heir relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely upon its
kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief of their wants; and address the
president as their great father., 22 As a result of the decision in Cherokee Nation,
tribes were considered to be independent in the sense that they could make laws
to be executed within their own boundaries, while at the same time being
subordinated to the federal government.
In Worcester v. Georgia23 the Supreme Court considered whether a Georgia
statute that prohibited white people from living in the Cherokee Nation was
consistent with the United States Constitution.24 Finding that the Georgia state
law was "void,' 25 Chief Justice Marshall noted that:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia
14. Id. at 573.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 574.
17. Id.
18. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
19. Id. at 15.
20. Id. at 20.
21. Id. at 17.
22. Id.
23. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
24. Id. at 541.
25. Id. at 561.
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have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of
congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this
nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of
the United States. 6
Ultimately, Chief Justice Marshall and the Court held that state laws have no
effect inside Indian reservation borders.2 v
The concepts of limiting tribal sovereignty set forth in the Marshall Trilogy
echo to this day. In 1959 the Supreme Court held in Williams v. Lee, 2 that the
tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction when an Indian is a party to an action if it
takes place on a reservation. 29 In Williams, a non-Indian, Lee, owned a store
located within the Najavo Indian Reservation and sold goods to the appellant
and his wife on credit."0 When Williams and his wife failed to pay, Lee initiated
suit in Arizona state court to collect this debt.3 Williams attempted to dismiss
the claims on the basis that the Arizona state court had no jurisdiction because
the tribal court alone had jurisdiction.32 The Court found that Indians' rights to
govern themselves would be infringed upon if state jurisdiction was allowed,
and held that the tribal court, and not the state court, had jurisdiction over
matters taking place on reservations involving Indians.3 In concluding, the
Court claimed that "[t]he cases in this Court have consistently guarded the
authority of Indian governments over their reservations."34
In Fisher v. District Court,35 the Court extended the holding in Williams. In
Fisher, the issue was whether a state court had jurisdiction over adoption
proceedings that involved only tribal members. 6 Holding that the state court did
not have jurisdiction over adoption proceedings involving only tribal members,
the Court noted that "[s]tate-court jurisdiction plainly would interfere with the
powers of self-government conferred upon the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and
exercised through the Tribal Court. It would subject a dispute arising on the
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
29. Id. at 220.
30. Id. 217-18.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 218.
33. Id. at 223.
34. Id.
35. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
36. Id. at 383.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol29/iss2/7
reservation among reservation Indians to a forum other than the one they have
established for themselves."37
From Worcester until 1978, the Court did not place further significant
limitations on tribal court jurisdiction. However, in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe,38 the Court considered whether tribal courts could exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-members within the reservation.39 The Court
placed further limitations on tribal sovereignty by holding that tribes lack
jurisdiction and authority to prosecute non-members "absent affirmative
delegation of such power by Congress."'4 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
stated that "[w]hile Congress never expressly forbade Indian tribes to impose
criminal penalties on non-Indians, we now make express our implicit conclusion
of nearly a century ago that Congress consistently believed this to be the
necessary result of its repeated legislative actions."41
Only months later, in United States v. Wheeler,4 2 the Supreme Court
considered the issue of whether double jeopardy precluded the prosecution of
an Indian in federal court when he had previously been convicted of a similar
offense in tribal court.43 The Court found that although tribes have given up
some aspects of their sovereignty, they still retained power and authority over
their members and their territory.' The Court noted that the tribe is not an "arm
of the Federal Government," '45 and therefore is its own sovereign when it
prosecutes one of its own members for violation of tribal law.' The Court
proclaimed that "[s]ince tribal and federal prosecutions are brought by separate
sovereigns, they are not 'for the same offence,' and the Double Jeopardy Clause
thus does not bar one when the other has occurred.,
47
Two years later in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation,8 the Court continued to take away tribal sovereignty by allowing
additional state regulation in tribal matters. In Washington, the Court held that
both the tribes and the state had an interest in the taxation of cigarettes and other
37. Id. at 387-88.
38. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
39. Id. at 195.
40. Id. at 208.
41. Id. at 204.
42. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
43. Id. at 314.
44. Id. at 323.
45. Id. at 329.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 329-30.
48. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
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tobacco products and the revenue that it would provide.49 This state tax on
certain items within the reservation would not be burdensome and would not
impede on the tribes' right to create laws and be governed by them."
One year after Washington, the seminal case of Montana v. United States5
began eliminating Indian tribes' sovereignty over relations with non-members.
The Crow Indians had a resolution that prohibited hunting and fishing within the
reservation by non-members. 2 The Court found that the tribes could regulate
hunting and fishing by non-members on land owned by the tribe or held in trust
for it and could additionally prohibit non-member entry onto their land.5
However, tribes did not have the power to regulate hunting and fishing on land
within the reservation that was owned by non-members.' The general rule for
determining whether a tribe has jurisdiction is that the "exercise of tribal power
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot
survive without express congressional delegation."5
The Court also set forth two exceptions to this general rule. The Court stated
that "Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee
lands"56 when (1) non-members "enter consensual relationships with the tribe
or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements"57 or (2) non-members' "conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe."58 The Court applied this test to the facts and found that non-Indian
hunting and fishing on non-Indian fee land within Indian country had no clear
relation to tribal self government or internal relations. Consequently, tribes
were not empowered to regulate hunting and fishing on land located within their
reservation owned by non-Indians.59
49. Id. at 156-57.
50. Id. at 157.
51. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
52. Id. at 549.
53. Id. at 557.
54. Id. at 566.
55. Id. at 564.
56. Id. at 565.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 566.
59. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol29/iss2/7
The Court continued to decrease tribal sovereignty over nonmembers in
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation.60 The Court
considered whether Yakima County or the Yakima Nation had the authority to
zone land located within the Yakima Reservation owned in fee by non-
members. 61 The Court determined that tribes do not have the authority to zone
lands located within the reservation owned in fee by nonmembers unless there
is a threat to the tribe's security, integrity, health or well-being.62
Ten years later, the Court continued to restrict tribal sovereignty over non-
members when it reaffrmned previous case law and found that tribal courts do
not have civil jurisdiction to decide claims that occurred on state highways
which run through a tribe's reservation. 63 The Court made a distinction between
Indian land and Indian country.64 "Indian country" as defined in 18 U.S.C. §
1151 includes all lands within the exterior boundaries of the reservation,
regardless of whether the lands are privately owned or public highways cross the
61reservations.
This spectrum of cases demonstrates that the Supreme Court has eroded and
minimized the concept of tribal sovereignty that the Marshall Trilogy set forth
in the early nineteenth century. At the time Hicks was decided in 2001, tribal
courts no longer had criminal jurisdiction over non-members66 or civil
jurisdiction over the activities of non-members occurring within Indian country
on land not owned by the tribe.67
60. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
61. Id. at 414.
62. Id. at 430-31.
63. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997).
64. Id. at 454 n.9.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) ("Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of
this title [18 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1156], the term "Indian country", as used in this chapter [18
U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq.], means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way
running through the same.")
66. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
67. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
NOTESNo. 2]
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B. Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002
Sen. Daniel Inouye (D.-Haw.) along with three co-sponsors68 introduced
Senate Bill 578 on March 7, 2003, known as the Tribal Government
Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002.69 This bill was referred to
the Committee on Governmental Affairs. 7' However, it was never acted upon
and was never reported out of committee.7' Aides of Senator Inouye anticipate
that this amendment "might be re-introduced - possibly with some changes in
language - as part of a package of amendments to the [Homeland Security
Act]."7
The official summary of Senate Bill 578, as introduced to the Senate,
provides that this bill amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to:
[I]nclude the participation of Indian tribes with respect to activities
of the Secretary of Homeland Security, including information
analysis and infrastructure protection, science and technology, the
Directorate of Border and Transportation Security, emergency
preparedness and response, treatment of charitable trusts for
members of the Armed Forces and other governmental
organizations, coordination with non-Federal entities, and training of
law enforcement officers by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms of the Department of Justice. 73 Essentially, the goal of the
(act) is to restore full tribal authority over Indian Country by: (1)
declaring Indian Country as tribal jurisdiction; (2) declaring
complete civil and criminal jurisdiction over all persons and
activities occurring in Indian Country; and (3) declaring regulatory
jurisdiction over taxation, environment, land use, water resources,
hunting and fishing, business activities, state schools, and all fee land
in Indian Country.74
68. S. 578, 108th Cong., infra note 6. The three cosponsors are: Sen. Ben Nighthorse
Campbell (R.-Colo.), Sen. Daniel K. Akaka (D.-Haw.), and Sen. Maria Cantwell (D.-Wash.).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Joyce Howard Price, Indians Want Jurisdiction to Combat Terrorism Threat, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004, available at http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040125-114704-
4729r.htm.
72. Id. (citing Patricia Zell, a legal staffer for Sen. Inouye).
73. S. 578, 108th Cong. - Summary as of 3/7/2003, available athttp://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN00578: @@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).
74. Jim Maniaci, Tribe Wants Control over Non-Indians Within Rez, GALLUP




In a speech given to the National Tribal Summit on Homeland Security, Sen.
Ben Nighthorse Campbell, a cosponsor of Senate Bill 578, stated that the
purpose of Senate Bill 578 is "to ensure that Indian tribes are afforded full
participation in the national effort to combat terrorism and protect our people
and our Homeland. ' 75 He explained that Senate Bill 578 would "make sure that
there are no gaps in our security framework along our borders or inside our
nation because ofjurisdictional differences between the Federal, state, tribal and
local governments."76
The current Homeland Security Act of 2002 states that "tribal governments
are included in the definition of 'local governments. '""' However, the
proposed amendments in Senate Bill 578 "would remove tribal governments
from the definition of 'local governments"' 78 and would instead insert tribal
governments where relevant.79 This change to the current Homeland Security
Act reflects the authors' belief that federal law should continue to distinguish
"between local governments that are political subdivisions of the States and
tribal governments."8 Ultimately, Senate Bill 578 ensures "that for purposes
of homeland security, the United States recognizes the inherent authority of
tribal governments to exercise jurisdiction currently with the Federal
government to assure that applicable criminal, civil and regulatory laws are
enforced on tribal lands."'"
III. Nevada v. Hicks
A. Facts and Procedural History
Floyd Hicks was a member of Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe of Western
Nevada who lived on the reservation. 2 He was suspected of having committed
a misdemeanor under Nevada state law - killing a protected California big horn
at http://www.gallupindependent.com/2003/04-22tribe.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005)
[hereinafter Maniaci].
75. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Prepared Remarks to the National Tribal Summit on
Homeland Security, Oct. 23, 2002, at http://indian.senate.gov/CampbellSecurity.PDF (last
visited Feb. 14, 2005).
76. Id.
77. Citizens Alliance, CERA Comments, at http://www.citizensalliance.org/The%20Hicks





82. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 355 (2001).
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
sheep off the reservation.83 Upon hearing rumors that Hicks had killed a big
horn sheep, a Nevada state game warden obtained a search warrant from Nevada
state court. 4 However, this warrant was subject to tribal court approval. The
state court judge found that tribal court authorization was necessary due to the
fact that the state court had no jurisdiction on the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone
reservation.86
A search warrant, therefore, was obtained from the tribal court.87 The state
game warden and a state police officer subsequently searched Hicks' premises
and took possession of a mounted bighorn sheep head.88 However, this sheep
head was an unprotected species and consequently was returned to Hicks. 9
One year later, a tribal officer informed the game warden that Hicks had two
mounted bighorn sheep heads in his home.9" Another search warrant was
sought from the state court along with approval from the tribal court.9 The
second search consisted of tribal police officers and state game wardens.92 As
in the first search, the mounted bighorn sheep heads were taken into possession
by officials but later returned to Hicks' because these to were found to be of an
unprotected species.93 Hicks subsequently sued the tribal judge, the state
wardens, the tribal officers, and the State of Nevada in tribal court.9'
Many of Hicks' claims were voluntarily dismissed but the claims against the
state game wardens in their individual capacities as defendants remained. 95 The
tribal court held that it had jurisdiction over the claims and this was later
affirmed by the Tribal Appeals Court.96 However, the State and the game
wardens sought declaratory judgment from the federal district court on the basis
that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction.97


















Hicks filed for summary judgment on the issue of jurisdiction and the court
subsequently granted summaryjudgment in favor of Hicks.9" The Ninth Circuit
affirmed on the basis that the tribal court had jurisdiction over the claims
because Hicks resided on tribe-owned land within the tribe's reservation.99 The
State and game wardens appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court where the Court
ultimately held that tribal courts have no jurisdiction for claims arising from
state officials' conduct in executing process (warrants) because it is not crucial
to tribal self government or administration of internal control.'I°
B. Majority's Analysis
Nevada v. Hicks was decided by a unanimous vote.'' Justice Scalia wrote
the majority opinion, joined by four other justices, while four separate
concurrences were written by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, O'Connor, and
Stevens, respectively. 2 In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that the Fallone
Paiute-Shoshone Tribal Court had no subject matter jurisdiction over civil
claims against state game wardens' actions.0 3 Furthermore, the Court held that
the tribal court also had no jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.'04
The Court first considered the question of whether tribal courts had
jurisdiction over the state game wardens' tortious conduct on tribal owned land.
The Court held that "tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing
process relating to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to
tribal self-government or internal relations."'0 5 The Court applied Montana and
Oliphant in reaching this conclusion."° It should be noted that Oliphant was a
criminal case whereas Montana was a civil case. In Montana, the Court applied
Oliphant and held that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary
to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent
with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation."'0 7  Moreover, the Montana Court allowed an
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 364-65.
101. Id. at 354.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 374.
104. Id. at 369.
105. Id. at 364.
106. Id. at 359-60.
107. Id. at 359 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)) (internal
quotations omitted).
No. 21
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
exception to this rule when nonmembers "enter consensual relationships with
the tribe or its members through [such things as] contracts."' 8
The Court considered who owned the land where the conduct of the state
game wardens occurred in deciding whether tribal regulation over the state game
wardens' conduct was necessary to protect the tribe's self-government or
internal control. Hicks' lawyer argued that "the Tribe may make its exercise of
regulatory authority over nonmembers a condition of nonmembers' entry."'"
The Court rejected this argument but instead found that "ownership status...
is only one factor to consider in determining whether regulation of the activities
of nonmembers is 'necessary to protect tribal government or control internal
relations.""'" However, the majority pointed out that in other instances land
ownership alone may be significant enough to be dispositive.lI After
determining that ownership alone could not allow regulatory jurisdiction over
non-members, the Court applied a balancing test and stated that "the State's
interest in execution of process is considerable enough to outweigh the tribal
interest in self-government even when it relates to Indian-fee lands.""' 2
The Court also considered "whether regulatory jurisdiction over state
officers ... is 'necessary to protect a tribe's self-government or to control
internal relations,' and if not, whether such regulatory jurisdiction has been
congressionally conferred.""' 3 After examining a number of previous cases, the
Court noted that "[o]ur cases make clear that the Indians' right to make their
own laws and be governed by them does not exclude all state regulatory
authority on the reservation. State sovereignty does not end at a reservation's
border.""' 4 Although the Court conceded that precedence did not clearly
indicate whether state officials have "the corollary right to enter a reservation
(including Indian fee lands) for enforcement purposes," they did explain that
precedence tended to suggest that state officials did have that right."5
Ultimately, the Court held that "tribal authority to regulate state officers in
executing process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not
essential to tribal self-government on internal relations.""' 6 Furthermore, the
Court found that "[t]he State's interest in execution of process is considerable,
108. Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565) (internal quotations omitted).
109. Id. at 359.
110. Id. at 360 (emphasis added) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
111. Id. at 370.
112. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
113. Id. at 360 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
114. Id. at 361.
115. Id. at 363.




and even when it relates to Indian-fee lands it no more impairs the tribe's self-
government than federal enforcement of federal laws impairs state
government."' 17
In considering whether Congress has conferred regulatory jurisdiction, the
Court pointed to 25 U.S.C. § 2806 which affirms that "law enforcement,
investigative, or judicial authority of any ... State, or political subdivision or
agency thereof' is altered by provisions of that statute."' The Court therefore
concluded that "no statutory scheme prescribes or even remotely suggests, that
state officers cannot enter a reservation ... to investigate or prosecute violations
of state law occurring off the reservation. ""9
The second issue the Court considered was whether a tribal court had
jurisdiction to hear 42 U.S.C § 1983 claims. 20 Hicks argued that tribal courts
were courts of general jurisdiction.' The Court rejected this argument and
instead found that relating to non-members, "a tribe's inherent adjudicative
jurisdiction... is at most only as broad as its legislative jurisdiction."'' 22 Tribal
courts have been given some adjudicative authority to hear federal law claims
by Congress, but § 1983 claims are not a part of this adjudicative authority.
23
Additionally, tribal courts lack jurisdiction over § 1983 claims because 28
U.S.C. § 1441124 does not provide for removal from a tribal court to a federal
court. 25 The allowance ofjurisdiction to tribal courts over § 1983 claims would
result in "serious anomalies" because defendants could not remove the case to
federal court if they were hauled into tribal court.2 6 The Court found that "the
simpler way to avoid the removal problem" was to not allow tribal courts
jurisdiction over § 1983 claims. 12 Therefore, the Court held that tribal courts
cannot adjudicate § 1983 claims since they are not courts of general jurisdiction
and do not have the ability to remove cases to a federal forum.
28
117. Id.
118. Id. at 366 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2806 (2000)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 367.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 367-68.
124. This is a removal statute that allows the defendant to have the case heard in federal
court even when the plaintiff originally filed the suit in state court.
125. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353,368 (2001).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 369.
128. Id.
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IV. Analysis
A. Senate Bill 578 Would Effectively Reverse Hicks and Twenty Years of
Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Although the drafters and proponents of the Tribal Government Amendments
to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Senate Bill 578) insist that this bill is
essential to the safety and security of the nation, Senate Bill 578, in its current
form, would effectively reverse Hicks and twenty years of Supreme Court
jurisprudence, taking away the constitutional rights and personal protections of
many non-tribal members. In order to protect the constitutional rights of
millions of citizens and to maintain longstanding judicial decisions from the
United States Supreme Court, Senate Bill 578, or any similar measure must not
be allowed to become law.
Section 13129 of Senate Bill 578 is one of the most controversial aspects of the
bill. In Section 13(a), the Amendment proposes that Congress "declare[] that the
inherent sovereign authority of an Indian tribal government includes the
authority to enforce and adjudicate violations of applicable criminal, civil, and
regulatory laws committed by any person on land under the jurisdiction of the
Indian tribal government."'3 ° This subsection alone would reverse a number of
Supreme Court decisions including Montana, Strate, Oliphant, and Hicks. 3' In
129. S. 578, 108th Cong., infra note 6. The relevant portion (Section 13) requires:
(a) IN GENERAL - For the purpose of this Act, Congress affirms and
declares that the inherent sovereign authority of an Indian tribal government
includes the authority to enforce and adjudicate violations of applicable criminal,
civil, and regulatory laws committed by any person on land under the jurisdiction
of the Indian tribal government, except as expressly and clearly limited by -
(1) a treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe; or
(2) an Act of Congress.
(b) SCOPE - The authority of an Indian tribal government described in
subsection (a) shall -
(1) be concurrent with the authority of the United States; and
(2) extend to -
(A) all places and persons within the Indian country (as defined in section
1151 of title 18, United States Code) under the concurrent jurisdiction of the
United States and the Indian tribal government; and
(B) any person, activity, or event having sufficient contacts with that land, or









each of these cases, the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes do not have
jurisdiction over non-members and the land of non-members. 132 Based on the
plain interpretation of section 13(a), this bill would provide tribes with "inherent
sovereign authority" and thus reverse the holdings in the aforementioned cases.
The effect of this provision is to give tribes civil, criminal, and regulatory
jurisdiction over any citizen of the United States who is within the jurisdiction
of the Indian tribal court.
Furthermore, sections 13(b)(l) and 13(b)(2)(A) state that the authority of an
Indian tribal government shall "be concurrent with the authority of the United
States" and "extend to all places and persons within the Indian country." 133 As
previously mentioned, "Indian country" includes all lands within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation, regardless of whether the lands are privately
owned or are public highways crossing reservations."' In effect, this provision
would make a person subject to tribal jurisdiction because of his presence in
Indian country, whether he lives within Indian country or is merely passing
through. If this bill were to be passed, "non-Indians who commit crimes within
reservation boundaries will be prosecuted in tribal, instead of state or federal
courts."' 35 Based on a 1990 Census, almost 400,000 American citizens live on
reservations but are not members of any Indian tribe.'36 Therefore, these
400,000 American citizens living on Indian reservations would be subject to
tribal jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of tribal governments over non-members would actually
extend to "any person, activity, or event having sufficient contacts with the land,
%20Analysis.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
132. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that tribes do not have the
power to regulate hunting and fishing on land within the reservation that is owned by
nonmembers); see also Strate v. A- I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,442 (1997) (holding that tribal
courts do not have civil jurisdiction to decide claims that occurred on state highways which run
through a particular tribes' reservation); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding that
the tribal court had no subject matter jurisdiction over civil claims against state game wardens'
actions and no jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that tribal courts cannot exercise
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers within the reservation).
133. S. 578, 108th Cong., infra note 6.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2000).
135. Maniaci, supra note 74.
136. William J. Darling, Analysis of Section 13 of Senate Bill 578 and House Bill 2242
Regarding Unprecedented Extension of Indian Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians, at
http://www.cizmensaliance.org/The%2OHicks%2OFix/S.578/S.578%2ODarling%20Opinion.htm
(last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
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or with a member of the Indian government."' 37 Therefore, non-Indians who
neither live within Indian country nor travel within it would also be subject to
tribal court jurisdiction for merely having "sufficient contacts" with the tribe.
This provides too much power and jurisdiction to tribal governments and tribal
courts. Therefore, "tribal governments would apparently replace or control state
and local governments in reservations and other areas of Indian country."' 38
Due to the nature of tribal governments, these 400,000 American citizens
living on reservations and the unknown number who merely have "sufficient
contacts" with the Indian tribes would be subject to the laws of the tribal
government, yet would not be given the right to participate in the tribal
government. This is due to the unique nature of tribal governments. A vast
number of Indian tribes exist throughout the United States. Although some of
these tribes are quite sophisticated and have legal systems similar to federal,
state, and local governments, many others are much less sophisticated.
Unfortunately, what works for some tribal governments will not work for others
due to their differences in membership, money, and their overall philosophy in
government. Therefore, it is not acceptable for these tribal governments that
vary so much in sophistication to be given authority over nonmembers, who
have no right to participate in tribal governance.
Many tribal governments are exclusive about membership within the tribe in
order to preserve their tribal identity, traditions, and culture.' 39 A number of
characteristics of some tribal governments are not conducive to allowing tribal
governments to exercise jurisdiction over non-members.' 4  First, in many
tribes, membership is by blood only and therefore no non-member without the
required heritage could ever become a member. 4 ' Second, few of the tribal
governments publish their court decisions and statutes and consequently many
citizens are unaware of the laws of the particular tribal government.42 Third,
many of the tribes are small and consequently do not have the financial or
human resources to effectively administer the plenary system of laws as the state
and federal governments are able to do.'43 Fourth, many tribal governments can
intentionally discriminate legally against non-members in order to preserve their
137. Citizens Alliance, CERA Analysis ofS.5 78, at http://www.citizensalliance.org/ The%20
Hicks%20Fix/S.578/S.578%2OAn%201ntroduction.htm (last visited Feb. 14,2005) [hereinafter
CERA Analysis].
138. Id.







traditions and culture.'" Last, many tribes do not operate in an "open" form of
government.'45 For those tribal governments that adhere to a "closed"
government, tribal meetings are not open to non-members (or even to members)
and finances remain hidden from members and non-members alike. 4 6 Based
on these exclusive and clandestine characteristics of some tribal governments,
tribal governments should not be given the sovereignty to retainjurisdiction over
non-members who happen to be traveling or living within the confines of the
reservation.
As a result of the structure and implementation of many tribal governments,
nonmembers would lose fundamental rights afforded by the Bill of Rights.'47
Additionally, non-members would be deprived of equal protection of the laws
as guaranteed to United States citizens by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 1
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B. Insufficient Justification of Senate Bill 578 By Sen. Daniel Inouye (D.-
Haw.) and Other Proponents
As justification for Senate Bill 578, Senator Inouye claimed in an interview
with The Las Vegas Review-Journal that this senate bill legislation "won't
expand tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians."' 149 Rather, he argues that "this bill
only allows tribes to arrest those engaged in terrorist activities [but] [t]he federal
courts would retain jurisdiction."' 5° Furthermore, he claimed that "only those
engaged in terrorist activities would be subject to Indian arrest. Offenders
would be tried in federal court."'151
Senator Inouye contends that the primary purpose of Senate Bill 578 is to
provide sufficient and necessary funding to the tribes so that they can be
adequately prepared to combat terrorism. Senate Bill 578 would simply
"reclassify tribal governments as 'states' under the [Homeland Security Act], so




147. CERA Analysis, supra note 137.
148. Id.
149. Inouye Says Bill Doesn't ExpandJurisdiction, INDIANZ.COM (Jul. 30, 2003), available
at http://www .indianz.com/News/archives/0005 I0.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
150. Id.
151. Samantha Young, Native Leaders Seek Greater Role in Homeland Security, LAS VEGAS
REV. J., Jul. 30, 2003, available athttp://www.reviewjoumal.com/lvrj_home/2003/Jul-30-Wed-
2003/news/21836112.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
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role in fighting terrorism."' 52 Currently, tribal governments apply for funds for
purposes of homeland security through county governments. 153  However,
because these county governments also require necessary funds for emergency
equipment and training, tribal governments are not able to acquire the necessary
funds to adequately protect their Indian lands from terrorism. 154 Donna Cossette,
a tribal chairwoman for the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe of Western Nevada,
stated that her tribe is a "sovereign government[] in the [United States] and
should be able to [obtain] federal funding"l51 for protecting their homeland from
terrorism rather than seeking this funding from county governments. '56
Senator Inouye has essentially presented Senate Bill 578 as a "technical
change" to the Homeland Security Act of 2002.' The technical change is
merely to reclassify tribal governments as states in order that they can begin to
receive federal funding for homeland land security purposes. Inouye claims that
"[n]ot giving Indian tribes funding to police more than 2,000 miles of
reservation borders with Mexico and Canada would be like 'putting up a sign
saying terrorists welcome. Go through this gate."" 58
Although Senator Inouye claims the purpose of this bill is to ensure homeland
security, his real intentions are evidenced by comments he has made to Indian
groups and supporters of the bill. In speech given at the National Congress of
American Indians (NCAI), Inouye claimed that the goal of Senate Bill 578 "was
to overturn recent Supreme Court rulings by recognizing that tribes have primary
law enforcement duties on their lands."'59 He went on to say that "[h]omeland
security presents an opportunity to secure a status under federal law that will not
only recognize [Indian tribes'] powers and responsibilities as sovereign
governments but will strengthen [their] position and [their] status in the family
of governments that make up the United States."' 6 Although Senator Inouye
and the other supporters of the bill have claimed that the purpose of Senate Bill
578 is purely for purposes of receiving funding to secure their Indian lands from
152. Joyce Howard Price, Indians Want Jurisdiction to Combat Terrorism Threat,
WASHINGTON TIMES (Jan. 26, 2004), available at http://www.washtimes.com/nationalU
20040125-114704-4729r.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
153. Young, supra note 151.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Donna Cossette, Tribal Chairwoman).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting Sen. Inouye).
159. Inouye Ties Sovereignty to Homeland Security, IND1ANZ.COM, Feb. 25, 2003, at





terrorism, his statements to supporters of the bill clearly indicate that the
Homeland Security Act is merely a bridge being used to strengthen the
sovereignty of the tribal governments.
Furthermore, Senator Inouye claimed that tribal governments should "be as
sovereign as any state in the union., 16' Again, it appears that Senator Inouye is
utilizing the continued concerns of homeland security as a result of September
11,2001, as a way to further his own and the tribal courts' agendas of regaining
some of the sovereignty lost as a result of twenty years of Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
V Conclusion
The potential passage of Senate Bill 578 would have significant
consequences on the recent Nevada v. Hicks162 decision as well as over twenty
years of Supreme Courtjurisprudence. Although the Marshall Trilogy set forth
the concept of tribal sovereignty in the early nineteenth century, later Supreme
Court jurisprudence has eroded this idea of tribal sovereignty one case at a time.
Even before Hicks was decided in 2001, the Supreme Court had previously held
that tribal courts no longer had criminal jurisdiction over non-members.'63
Moreover, the Court also held that tribal courts no longer had civil jurisdiction
over the activities of non-members occurring within Indian country on land not
owned by the tribe."6 The Supreme Court in Hicks continued to limit tribal
sovereignty when it found that state officers may enter a reservation without
tribal permission to investigate or prosecute an off-reservation violation of state
law. 1
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An amendment to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that overturns Nevada
v. Hicks and twenty years of previous Supreme Court decisions should not be
allowed to become law. The Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities to
consider and reconsider its position on tribal sovereignty, and Hicks is simply
the latest evidence that the continual limiting of tribal sovereignty is still good
law.
Some may say that federal law enforcement oversight is currently so
ineffective on some reservations that Senate Bill 578 is needed to allow Indians
to take care of themselves and to protect the homeland from terrorism. "[W]ith
the existing Homeland Security Act, not all critical infrastructure is adequately
161. Id.
162. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
163. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
164. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
165. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 374.
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protected. Borders are still open to illegal immigrants." '166 Furthermore, "[w]ith
miles and miles of open terrain bordering both Canada and Mexico, terrorists
have an easy way to pass into the country undetected. The imagination runs wild
with possible scenarios of illegal migrants entering the country to cause great
tragedy and devastation."' 6 7 Despite the fact that there are miles and miles of
unprotected borders and that federal and state law enforcement cannot
sufficiently protect these borders, the solution is not to amend the Homeland
Security Act with a bill that potentially eliminates a significant portion of
constitutional rights for hundreds of thousands of Americans. The concerns
raised are legitimate, and appropriate action should be taken by the United
States government to remedy such security issues at the borders. However,
remedying these security issues at the expense of individuals' constitutional
rights is not acceptable.
166. Jennifer Butts, Victims in Waiting: How the Homeland SecurityAct Falls Short of Fully
Protecting Tribal Lands, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 373, 374 (2003-2004).
167. Id. at 375.
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